the perils of a traditional strike, the unionists resorted to the sit-down.
The NLRB bypassed the workers' claim of self-defense by ordering Fansteel to reinstate the strikers as a remedy for the company's pre-strike unfair labor practices. 18 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, squarely confronted the issue of whether the sit-down was protected under the NLRA. In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Board could not reinstate sit-downers even though their strike would not have occurred but for the employer's violations of law. According to the Chief Justice, the strikers lost their status as statutory "employees" when Fansteel discharged them. And since the NLRB was empowered to reinstate only "employees," it could not reinstate the fired strikers. 19 Why was it legal for Fansteel to terminate employees for responding with selfhelp to its own statutory violations? The opinion made it clear that the employer's common-law property rights were of a different and higher order than the employees' statutory labor rights. While the company's repeated violations of the workers' right to organize did not deprive the company of "its legal rights to the possession and protection of its property," the workers' violation of the employer's property rights put them "outside the protection of the statute." 20 At no point in his opinion for the majority did Chief Justice Hughes mention the impact of the employer's unfair labor practices on the workers' statutory rights. In fact, the Court was so little concerned about the corporation's violations that it referred to the sit-down as "an illegal seizure of the buildings in order to prevent their use by the employer in a lawful manner." 21 How did the corporation's common law property rights rise so far above the workers' statutory rights? Constitutional law operated both to pump up the former and to deflate the latter. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, the Court had upheld the Board's power to reinstate a worker fired for union activity, but only because the Act allowed the employer to fire a worker for any other reason, and thus did "not 389, 394-95; Hart & Prichard, supra note 16, at 1280-81. At the time of the Fansteel strike, the Board had already developed the rule that workers who struck in protest of unfair labor practices could not be permanently replaced. Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936) (1937) . But relying on this rule would do nothing to protect the workers or their union during the period that unfair labor practice charges were pending -a period that, judging from the five-month delay that had already ensued since the union filed its charges, would be a long one.
18. The Board reasoned that reinstatement was necessary to restore the status quo prevailing prior to the employer's violations. [Vol. 103:518 interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them." 22 In Fansteel, Chief Justice Hughes characterized the issue as whether the Act abrogated the employer's right to fire workers who had illegally seized its property -certainly a "normal" exercise of the right to discharge. 23 "Apart from the question of the constitutional validity of an enactment of that sort," he wrote, "it is enough to say that such a legislative intention should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression." 24 The Chief Justice did not cite any authority for the existence of a constitutional right to discharge workers, a gap that was filled in Fansteel's brief with citations to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and to the Lochner-era cases of Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas. 25 Thus, in both Jones & Laughlin and Fansteel, the Court affirmed that employers continued to enjoy a constitutional right to discharge workers under the due process clause.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added). Michigan Law Review
While the employer's right to fire workers rose to the constitutional level, the workers' statutory right to organize all but disappeared from consideration. This too had its roots in constitutional thinking, here grounded on the Commerce Clause. In Jones & Laughlin, the Court had held that a Board order could survive constitutional challenge only if the particular unfair labor practices at issue actually affected interstate commerce and thus fell within Congress's commerce power. 26 NLRB General Counsel Charles Fahy interpreted this to mean that the reach of the Act to a particular enterprise hinged on whether "stoppage of . . . operations by industrial strife" in that enterprise would substantially interrupt or interfere with interstate commerce. 27 In its anxiousness to win this point, the Board focused solely on the commerce-protecting purpose of the Act, which tended to cast unions and strikers as dangerous disruptors of commerce. Forgotten were other NLRA policies that might have 22 . 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937) .
23. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. at 252.
24.
Id. at 255. Justice Stone's concurrence took a similar approach, observing that if the Act had expressed an intention to bar employers from discharging workers for "unlawful practices," he "should have thought it of sufficiently dubious constitutionality to require us to construe its language otherwise, if that could reasonably be done . . . ." Id. at 265 (Stone, J., concurring). offered stronger support for the Board's orders -policies like "restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees," "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," and "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing." 28 The Court went a step further. Not only did the Justices follow the Board in skipping over these policies and focusing solely on protecting commerce, but they also substituted their own judgment for that of Congress as to how commerce would best be protected. Section 1 of the Act declared that it was "the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing. . . ." 29 The causes to be eliminated were the "denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining." 30 In this light, it seems clear that -whatever else they were doing -the Fansteel strikers were serving the primary purpose of the Act by enforcing its guarantee of the right to organize and thereby helping to "eliminate the causes" of strikes. The NLRB had failed to take action on their unfair labor practice charge, filed five months before the sit-down, and their union was threatened with destruction due to the employer's violations. An outside strike would have exposed the workers to replacement, a danger underscored by the fact that the company's spy in the union was urging that course of action. 31 Only by sitting down could the workers prevent the employer from reaping the benefits of its violations.
To the Court, however, the need for a prompt remedy did not register in the balance. Chief Justice Hughes declined to consider whether the workers' mode of enforcement was necessary or effective, but considered only whether it was peaceful. Since the sit-down strike involved "force and violence in defiance of the law of the land," it clearly did not promote industrial peace. 32 The procedures of the Act, on the other hand, were "peaceful." The Court did not pause to consider whether the Board's peaceful processes could, as a practical matter, remedy the employer's destruction of the union's majority support. Thus, the statutory strategy of eliminating the causes of The Court's lack of concern for the workers' statutory rights cannot be blamed entirely on Chief Justice Hughes or the Fansteel majority. The statute itself reduced the workers' rights to the status of mere means to the end of preventing disruptions to commerce. This was the result of a conscious choice by the bill's creator, Senator Robert Wagner of New York. Labor leaders and others had urged the Senator to ground his bill not on Congress's commerce power but on its human rights powers. To Andrew Furuseth, the labor movement's leading constitutional thinker, the bill exemplified the "Christian principle of evolution from slavery to freedom," which belonged under the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. 34 Philosophically, Senator Wagner took a similar view of his bill. Along with other proponents of the NLRA, he likened the non-union workplace to feudalism and slavery, and he promised that government enforcement of the right to organize would bestow upon workers "emancipation from economic slavery and . . . an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact as well as in name." 35 But Senator Wagner adhered to the commerce power as a constitutional justification, apparently in the belief that it was more acceptable to middle-class reformers and judges. 36 As a result, each exercise of the NLRB's authority had to be justified not in terms of labor freedom, but as an effort to prevent disruptions to commerce. During the early, formative period of NLRA jurisprudence, this constitutional requirement shaped the developing interpretation of the statute. Even the Board's own lawyers defended the Act as an exercise of Congress's power to "control" and "punish" strikes under Lochnerera precedents. 37 In its Fansteel opinion, as we have seen, the Board focused solely on the protection of commerce, failing even to mention the express statutory policies in favor of equal bargaining power, freedom of association, or collective bargaining. In hindsight, it seems inevitable that courts would be tempted to bypass those policies and directly discourage workers from striking, thereby protecting commerce.
Senator Wagner foresaw this possibility and inserted language to prevent it. Section 13 provided that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 38 The Senator explained that the Act was designed "to reduce the number of strikes by eliminating the main wrongs and injustices that cause strikes." Accordingly, the "imposition of legal restrictions upon the right to strike, instead of removing these wrongs, would merely deprive the worker of his inalienable right to protest against them."
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But Fansteel demonstrated the inadequacy of section 13 as a control on judges. Chief Justice Hughes easily dismissed the strikers' section 13 argument on the ground that "the right to strike" encompassed only "the unquestioned right to quit work."
40 Senator Wagner's broader view of section 13 ("I would not buy peace," he said, "at the price of slavery" 41 ) dropped out. The Court did not even consider the price of peace in Fansteel. And the peace that followed its decision was one of unbridled employer domination. By barring the Board from reinstating the strikers, the Court left Fansteel with a workforce composed of striker replacements and workers who had crossed the union's picket lines. This workforce rejected the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and voted to be represented by an in-house union, which Fansteel promptly recognized as the exclusive representative for all its production employees. 42 This "union" negotiated a grievance procedure culminating in a final decision not by an impartial arbitrator, but by Fansteel's President, R.J. Aitchison. In April of 1939, Aitchison looked back with satisfaction on the course of events. Relations with the employees were "closer than ever before" -so close that not a single grievance had been filed under the new at 81-82. In what did this liberalization consist? Not in any regret for the company's unfair labor practices, but in "explaining more to the employees and in giving more attention to employee relations." 45 Not only did Aitchison enjoy the new docility of his workforce, but he also received a raft of "fan mail" from other employers congratulating the company on its historic victory. 46 Just how historic became increasingly apparent over time. The courts and, eventually, the NLRB read Fansteel broadly to authorize the discharge of workers for engaging in slow-downs and other partial strike activities. 47 More recently, the Supreme Court relied on Fansteel to support its decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, denying backpay to undocumented aliens who had been fired for joining a labor union. 48 In Hoffman, as in Fansteel, both the workers and the company had violated the law. And as in Fansteel, the Court held that the workers' violations deprived them of their remedy for the employer's violations. Thus, the workers suffered not only the legal penalties for their lawbreaking -imprisonment and fines in Fansteel, deportation in Hoffman -but also the disruption of their unions and the loss of jobs and pay. By contrast, the employers in both cases enjoyed the benefits of their lawbreaking, unimpeded by any sanction other than an order to post notices promising to refrain from future violationsnotices that might as well have bragged: "Look what we got away with." Hoffman has effectively created "an underclass of low-wage Latino immigrants" whose legal status resembles that of slavery or involuntary servitude in its denial of any effective remedy for violations of worker rights. 50 According to this dictum, an employer enjoys the right permanently to replace workers who strike for better wages and conditions. The dictum is puzzling because the strike is one of those "concerted activities" protected under section 7, and employers are prohibited from discharging or otherwise interfering with, restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees for exercising section 7 rights. 51 Yet the Mackay Court simply asserted the employer right, offering no explanation why strikers -who are admittedly protected against "discharge" -can nevertheless be replaced permanently at the discretion of the employer.
The employer's right to hire permanent replacements operates as an unqualified trump over the section 7 right to strike for better conditions and higher wages. The employer need not show any business reason for its exercise (for example, that unless replacements are offered permanent employment the company will be unable to continue operating), and the rule leaves no room for the Board to argue that the impact of permanent replacement on the section 7 right outweighs the employer's interest. 52 Theoretically, an employer violates the Act if it replaces strikers for reasons of anti-union animus. But because animus is virtually impossible to prove (unless the employer is clumsy enough to reveal it in public), the law does nothing to prevent an employer from seizing on the strike as an opportunity to replace union with nonunion workers. 53 In effect, when workers go out on strike, they give the employer a license to discriminate; the employer need only limit itself to (1) "permanently replacing" union workers as opposed to "discharging" them, and (2) discriminating only between strikebreakers and strikers as opposed to discriminating among loyal strikers (as on the facts of Mackay, where the employer targeted active unionists for replacement) or among strikebreakers.
The result is a bizarre reversal of the strike's traditional function. Although the strike is legally protected so that it can provide workers with a source of bargaining power, it now serves as a source of employer bargaining power. According to a recent study of collective bargaining negotiations, employers are now more likely to threaten permanent replacement than unions are to threaten a strike. 54 As Cynthia Estlund recently put it, the Mackay dictum has "rendered the strike useless and virtually suicidal for many employees, and has become employers' Exhibit Number One in union organizing campaigns." 55 As employers have turned increasingly to permanent replacements, the incidence of strikes has dropped sharply. 56 That the labor movement considers the Mackay dictum to be a serious problem is evidenced by the fact that in 1996, at a time when the Presidency and both houses of Congress were held by Democrats, the AFL-CIO launched an intense campaign for legislation to overturn it -only to see the bill succumb twice to Senate filibusters.
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The Mackay Court cited no source and offered no reasoning to support the existence of an employer right permanently to replace strikers. 58 The statutory language, which makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer to engage in "discrimination" based on union activity or to "coerce" employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, appears to negate any such right. 59 An employer that retains nonstriking workers at the end of a strike while denying returning strikers their jobs is certainly discriminating -in the ordinary meaning of the word -based on union activity. 60 60. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 24-25; GORMAN, supra note 52, at 329. Employers sometimes argue that there are no positions for the returning strikers because the replacements are in current possession. However, the strikers were in possession prior to the strike, and section 2(3) of the Act specifies that "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment" remains an "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
picket lines are rewarded with permanent jobs, while workers who exercise their statutory right to strike are punished with the loss of their jobs. And there are few more potent forms of coercion than forcing individual workers to choose between a protected activity and losing their jobs to permanent replacements. Whether the loss of a job comes as a result of a discharge (concededly illegal) or of "permanent replacement," it certainly constitutes a powerful disincentive to engage in protected activity. Furthermore, at the time of Mackay, section 13 of the Act barred courts not only from construing the Act to impose direct legal restraints on the right to strike, but also from reading it to "interfere with or impede or diminish" the right "in any way."
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Commentators have tried to fit the Mackay dictum into the structure of current law by asserting that it rests on the assumption that employers have a legitimate business need to offer prospective replacements permanent employment in order to operate during strikes. 62 But the Court never made any such determination, and there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the Justices were thinking along those lines. If they were, then they were simply wrong on the facts. Employers routinely succeed in obtaining striker replacements without offering permanent employment, and there is no evidence that they need to make such offers. 63 Moreover, the Mackay dictum would not fit into the structure of current law even if employers could show that they were motivated by a desire to attract replacement workers. Under the current standard, which outlaws employer countermeasures that are "inherently destructive" of section 7 rights even if the employer acted out of legitimate business reasons, the hiring of permanent replacement workers would seem to be inherently destructive just as discharge is inherently destructive. 64 In short, the Mackay dictum cannot be explained or rationalized with reference to the employer's need to hire striker replacements.
Looking at the paper trail leading up to the dictum, we find that the issue was treated not as a question of the employer's business necessity, but rather as a matter of constitutional law. As in Fansteel, the employer claimed constitutional protection for its freedom to terminate strikers, and argued that termination would promote the statute's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions to interstate commerce. Mackay Company lawyers contended that a Board order reinstating economic strikers would deprive the employer of its property and liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. As long as the employer had not provoked the strike by unfair labor practices, its "ordinary right" to select its employees remained "invulnerable." And, although strikers technically remained employees, they had no current contractual relation with their employer. Thus, concluded Mackay's lawyers, a Board order reinstating strikers would, in effect, force the employer to enter into a new contract with the strikers -a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment. 65 In addition, the company's lawyers argued that strikers should be faced with the possibility of losing their jobs permanently, because that threat would discourage them from striking, thus promoting the statutory policy of preventing disruptions to interstate commerce. 66 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit twice ruled for the employer, with Judge Curtis Wilbur writing two lead opinions adopting Mackay's Fifth Amendment theory -one before Jones & Laughlin and one afterward, on rehearing.
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While Mackay's lawyers and Judge Wilbur elevated the employer's rights to the constitutional level, the NLRB subsumed the workers' rights into the Act's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions to interstate commerce. Employer interference with union activity tended to provoke strikes, reasoned the Board, and strikes injured commerce -as illustrated by the Mackay strike itself, which drastically reduced the company's communications traffic and resulted in considerable loss of business. 68 This argument fit right in with the constitutional theory embraced by the Supreme Court in Jones & Laughlin and its companion cases, but it also portrayed the strikers' legally protected activity as a kind of economic vandalism. It dovetailed with the employer's argument that to grant the Board power to reinstate strikers "would thwart rather than accomplish" the Act's purposes because, "[b]y guaranteeing a striker his job, . . . peaceful negotiation would be discouraged and strikes would be encouraged." 69 The Board made no mention of the statutory policies in favor of equal bargaining power or full freedom of association. Nor did it make any mention of section 13, which had been inserted into the Act precisely to ensure that the right to strike would not be suppressed as a means of obtaining industrial peace. 70 As to the specific issue of permanent replacement, the Board based its original finding of a violation not on the company's refusal to reinstate economic strikers per se, but on its discrimination among returning strikers in selecting who would fill the positions that were available at the end of the strike. The opinion explained that the employer had illegally refused to reinstate union officers and activists while, at the same time, reinstating less active strikers. The Board declined to address the broader question of the employer's right to retain replacement workers in preference to economic strikers because "a decision on the point is not necessary to the final judgment."
71 But in the Supreme Court, the Board's General Counsel, Charles Fahy, conceded that an employer could replace strikers and then, at the conclusion of the strike, retain the replacements and refuse to reinstate the would-be returning strikers. 72 Scholars have wondered why Fahy made this apparently gratuitous concession. From a constitutional perspective, however, it does not appear gratuitous. Throughout the litigation, Mackay's lawyers and the Court of Appeals majority had insisted that the Board was seeking a general power to reinstate economic strikers at the end of the strike. In the Court of Appeals' first decision, Judge Wilbur's lead opinion went so far as to claim that the Board had relied "solely" on the broad contention that it was unlawful for the employer to refuse to reinstate economic strikers. 73 From the Board's point of view, this was nothing more than an obfuscation; the Board had claimed only the limited power to remedy discrimination among the strikers. But from the point of view of the employer and the Court of Appeals majority, whose approach to the case centered on preserving the employer's "normal" Fifth Amendment right to select its employees, this was a distinction without a difference. Either way, the employer would be forced to make new contracts with strikers who had -voluntarily and unprovoked by any employer unfair labor practices -terminated their previous contractual relations by going on strike. At first, Fahy responded to this problem by trying to clarify the Board's position. In June 1937, he urged his regional lawyers to explain on rehearing that the Board's order hinged not on discrimination against strikers generally, but on discrimination for union membership and leadership among the returning strikers.
75 At this point, there was no talk of any concession; Fahy continued to follow the Board's original approach of distinguishing -without conceding -the permanent replacement issue. But the Court of Appeals again conflated the issues and accepted Mackay's economic due process argument. 76 Fahy responded by attempting once more to explain without making any concession, this time in the Board's initial brief to the Supreme Court.
77 But Mackay's lawyers ignored this explanation and insisted yet again that the Board was claiming a general power to reinstate economic strikers in preference to replacement workers -a power "so obnoxious to the basic principles of our Bill of Rights that it cannot stand."
78 It was at this point, in the Board's reply brief, that Fahy made his fateful concession as part of a seven-page discourse explaining, from every possible angle, that the company's argument rested on a "gross misstatement of the Board's position."
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Of course, we can never know for certain the reason for Fahy's decision. 80 Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that he was 75 . Fahy suggested that "it would be wise to refute the statement in Judge Wilbur's opinion that the Board predicated its conclusion of discrimination 'upon the inference arising from the refusal of the respondent to reemploy these individuals solely from the fact that they were union employees who had been engaged actively in an unsuccessful strike and who desired and were refused reemployment,'" and pointed out the fact that the strikers denied reinstatement "were the most active union officers or strike leaders. attempting to accomplish by concession what the NLRB lawyers had repeatedly failed to accomplish by explanation -namely, assuaging fears that a holding for the Board in Mackay would effectively empower it to compel employers to rehire all economic strikers. This fear had already led to two Court of Appeals decisions applying the Fifth Amendment to negate any Board power to reinstate strikers, whether or not there had been discrimination among the strikers. But if the Board could not convince skeptics of its narrow intentions, it could outright negate any possible fears as to the broad issue by conceding that issue in no uncertain terms. To pay for this negation, the Board would give up only the dubious privilege of trying to defend a general Board power to reinstate strikers against constitutional challenges. Evidence that this would be a difficult task came not only from conservative judicial activists like Judge Wilbur, but also from proponents of deference like Augustus and Learned Hand. Two months before Fahy made his concession, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that included both Hands upheld a Board order reinstating unfair labor practice strikers against due process attack on grounds that implied economic strikers would not have prevailed. "[N]o more is done," reasoned the court, "than to maintain the status quo which existed on December 14, 1936, as against unfair labor practices which occurred thereafter." 81 The panel's use of this rationale implied that if the strike had not been triggered by the employer's unfair labor practices, the employer would have continued to enjoy its constitutional right to select its employees. In short, it seems likely that Fahy traded the permanent replacement issue for a favorable holding on the constitutional objection to the reinstatement order in Mackay.
At first, the Mackay dictum had little impact on the ground. Strikers used mass picket lines to block even temporary replacements. Employers called on police to open the lines, but unions insisted that police action against "peaceful" mass picket lines amounted to partisan intervention in violation of the right to strike. During the great post-war strike wave of 1946 and 1947, the big industrial unions of the CIO called mass demonstrations and mobilized political pressure to keep the police "neutral" in labor disputes. In Rochester, New York; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Stamford, Connecticut; and Oakland, California, workers staged city-wide general strikes to protest police attacks on mass picket lines. 82 Most unionized employers soon gave up the idea of trying to operate with replacement workers. While the official law continued to grant employers the right to operate during strikes, an unofficial norm barred them from doing so. Writing in 1956, Jack Barbash described the "prevailing situation" in the United States: "[T]he employer . . . makes no attempt to operate the plant during the strike and the picket line becomes only the symbolic expression of the strike."
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By the early 1960s, however, a new generation of managers had begun to replace those who had experienced the mass picket lines of the 1940s. Meanwhile, labor leaders had come to rely less on solidarity and strike action than on government processes and employer goodwill. When the new managers challenged the old norm, they were pleasantly surprised to discover that labor's tradition of solidarity had atrophied to the point that many workers were happy to cross picket lines. By the mid-1980s, the Mackay rule had become fully effective on the ground, and striking was no longer a viable option for most workers.
III. HOW THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD LOST ITS TEETH
The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB cannot act to deter unfair labor practices, but must limit itself to remedying harms inflicted by parties before the Board. 85 As a result, employers have little incentive to comply with the law. From a cost-benefit point of view, it is often profitable to fire union advocates. If the employer can avoid even a modest wage increase, the savings are likely to exceed many times over the costs of any back-pay awards that the Board might eventually assess.
86 It is not surprising, then, that employers fire or otherwise retaliate against one out of every eighteen private-sector workers who support a union organizing campaign. 87 In the late 1970s, the labor movement and its allies waged a major campaign for legislation to authorize penalties, but the resulting Labor Law Reform 89 There, the Court announced that the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices was "remedial, not punitive" and that it must be exercised as "a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation" -not as a means of deterring the violations themselves -and even then, only "where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act."
90 As in Mackay, the Court offered no explanation for its conclusion. Chief Justice Hughes forthrightly depicted it as a matter of opinion:
We think that [the statutory] authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an order.
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The Court's prohibition on deterrence finds scant support in the statutory language, which authorizes the Board to order violators "to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act] ." 92 The very breadth of this language poses a problem for interpretation. During the legislative hearings, one witness described it as "the provision that . . . you may require them to do anything else that you want them to do that you think is in accordance with the purpose of the act" and complained that it was "so vague and indefinite that, judging by previous court decisions as to statutes being void for indefiniteness, I am not sure that that section is specific enough." discretion; the question was what the limits would be. However, the Court's choice to draw the line so as to prohibit any consideration of deterrence conflicted with the statutory command to order action that would "effectuate the policies of this Act," all of which required the deterrence of unfair labor practices and not merely their remediation. The Act proceeded from the theory that unfair labor practices triggered strikes, and strikes burdened commerce. 94 Accordingly, section 1 of the Act clearly set forth both ex ante deterrent and ex post remedial policies, with ex ante deterrence coming first:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 96 The agreements had been negotiated in the midst of an organizing effort by the United Electrical Workers (UE), a CIO affiliate with a reputation for militancy. 97 The Board found that the company had discriminated against the UE and in favor of the IBEW. 98 According to the Board, the company had discharged six UE activists, had engaged in industrial espionage against the UE, and had provided material assistance to the IBEW, including allowing its representatives to conduct business on company property during working hours. In the 94. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . ."). midst of these violations, the company recognized the IBEW locals as the representatives for their members and commenced collective bargaining. Within two months, the company had concluded agreements with the IBEW locals, and those locals -which had enrolled almost no members as of the grant of recognition -had signed up 30,000 of the company's 38,000 employees. The Board found that although the grant of recognition and the collective bargaining agreement purported to cover IBEW members only, the company's policy had been to negotiate with no other union and to extend the collective bargaining agreements to all employees. 99 Hence, the contracts interfered with the workers' free choice of representatives and had to be dissolved.
Id. (emphasis added
The Court disapproved this order for two reasons, both of which flowed from constitutional concerns. First, the order conflicted with the Court's view of how best to fulfill the constitutionally required function of facilitating interstate commerce. As in Fansteel and Mackay, the Board's decision had stressed this goal to the exclusion of all others. It described in terrifying detail the "disastrous effect" that a strike against such a large provider of electric and gas power would inflict on interstate commerce. 100 The Supreme Court heartily shared this concern, but found the Board's solution perverse. Taking the situation after the employer's violations as a given, Chief Justice Hughes argued that because the IBEW contracts prohibited strikes and provided for the arbitration of disputes, they were "highly protective to interstate and foreign commerce." Voiding such contracts, "even pending proceedings to ascertain by an election the wishes of the majority of employees, would remove that salutary protection during the intervening period." Thus, the contracts did not "affect commerce" in a way that would justify their abrogation.
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To the Court, then, the statutory policy in favor of "full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives" was contingent on a case-by-case judicial determination as to whether vindicating those freedoms would facilitate interstate commerce. The employer won in court because its admittedly illegal discrimination was effective on the ground. Once eighty percent of the workers acquiesced in the employer's choice of union, it became highly unlikely that the violations would provoke a strike or otherwise disrupt commerce. Since Consolidated Edison's illegal discrimination had already worked to promote the "fundamental" purpose of protecting commerce, 102 it would be silly to insist that peace be achieved -if at all -through the exercise of worker freedom. Second, the Court was concerned about the Board order's intrusion on the parties' liberty of contract. The IBEW's lawyers had argued that by "absolutely and utterly" destroying "existing contracts of labor organizations of long established standing," the Board had unconstitutionally taken the union's property and impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
103 They further urged the Court to apply a clear statement rule that "[p]ower over and affecting the life, liberty, property and security of the citizen may not be taken by inference, but only when the statute under which it is claimed demonstrates a plain intent to grant it."
104 Chief Justice Hughes duly prefaced his analysis of the Board's statutory power to order "affirmative action" by noting that "the Act gives no express authority to the Board to invalidate contracts with independent labor organizations." 105 He then proceeded to hold that the IBEW's members "had the right to choose the Brotherhood as their representative for collective bargaining and to have contracts made as the result of that bargaining" and that the employer's unfair labor practices had not "deprived them of that right."
106 Hughes purported to derive this right from the statute but, as Christopher Tomlins has pointed out, the ruling "was an important affirmation of the supremacy of the common law of contract."
107 To Hughes, the employer's suppression of the UE and support for the IBEW could not justify abrogating the IBEW contracts as long as that union had any members "who joined voluntarily." 108 The contract rights of those members and their union thus trumped the statutory right of the majority of workers to select "representatives of their own choosing."
In dissent, Justice Reed argued that the Board must be empowered to "nullify advantages" that the employer had gained by favoring the IBEW -a purpose that sounded more in deterrence than in remedy. 109 To hold otherwise would be "to withdraw from the Board the specific authority granted by the Act to take affirmative action to protect the workers' right of self-organization." Where the Board had stressed solely the statutory purpose of protecting commerce, Reed tried to build up the purpose of worker freedom. He agreed with Chief Justice Hughes that the "fundamental purpose" of the Act was to 103 protect commerce, and that this purpose was to be accomplished through collectively bargained contracts. But to Reed, the statute contemplated only contracts that had been negotiated by unions "created through the self-organization of workers, free from interference, restraint or coercion of the employer." The right of selforganization was "the basic privilege guaranteed by the Act," and "[f]reedom from employer domination flows from freedom in selforganization."
110
Reed's treatment of the statutory purposes undoubtedly tracked the intentions of the Act's framers. They had elevated the commerceprotecting purpose over all others not because they believed it was more important, but because it was the centerpiece of their constitutional strategy.
111 However, once this purpose was given priority in the statutory text, the Court could scarcely be blamed for taking the framers at their word. Its twofold transgression lay, instead, first in valuing the common law contract rights of the employer and the IBEW over the statutory right of the employees to select their bargaining representative, and second, in substituting its own, ex post facto view of how to facilitate commerce in place of the statute's ex ante goal of eliminating the causes of industrial disputes. In the years following Consolidated Edison, the Court's specific holding on the abrogation of contracts has been narrowed, 112 but its general prohibition against the deterrence of unfair labor practices lives on.
IV. HOW UNION ORGANIZERS BECAME TRESPASSERS
Under the NLRA, the preferred method for establishing collective bargaining is the union representation election. To most Americans, the word "election" connotes a political contest between two parties of equal legal status. The party currently in office is prohibited from using the power of government against the opposition party. But union representation campaigns are conducted on turf controlled by one of the competing parties, namely the employer. Current law allows employers to use this control to gain advantages unheard of in political elections. The employer may command voters to attend antiunion rallies on pain of discharge. It may require voters to meet oneon-one with their supervisors to hear anti-union messages. And it may adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting everyone but itself from 110. Id. campaigning during work time. 113 Though daunting, these advantages could be at least partly offset if union organizers could enter the workplace to respond. But except in exceedingly rare circumstances, employers also enjoy the right to exclude organizers from their property.
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court set forth the rule that section 7 leaves intact the employer's property right to exclude "nonemployee" union organizers from company property "except in the rare case where 'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels.'" 114 The Board is "not permitted" to balance the employees' statutory interest in receiving information against the employer's "right to control the use of his property." 115 Instead, the employer's property rights automatically prevail unless "unique obstacles" prevent communication, as in remote logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels, where the employees both live and work on the employer's premises. 116 The employer need not plead any business interest to justify excluding organizers and may, in fact, restrict access for the precise purpose of preventing communication from reaching its employees. 117 Because employees typically scatter after work, the Lechmere rule poses a serious obstacle to organizing. 118 1577-78 (1996) (observing that the "shift to more anonymous suburban residential patterns meant that increasingly dispersed employee populations were less accessible to reasonable efforts at off-site communication," and pointing out that the "usual channels for such communication -mail, telephone, home visits -also were less likely to be effective because of people's fatigued response to the impersonal tactics of the "solicitation industry"). The facts of Lechmere illustrate the problem. Despite the union's good fortune in obtaining cooperation from the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles in attaching names to employees' license plates, it was able to contact directly only 20 percent of the employees. In the Court's view, the section 7 right of the remaining 80 percent to receive information about self-organization was satisfied as long as union organizers could hold up placards along the public roadway. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540. The Court has since mitigated the effects of Lechmere for some unions by upholding the NLRB's ruling that a paid union organizer who seeks employment at a company in order to organize its employees is a statutory "employee" protected against discrimination in hiring and firing. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995) . Departing sharply from its approach in Lechmere, the Town & Country Court went straight to the statutory definition, employers to stage captive audience speeches and to campaign on working time while barring workers from doing the same, it puts unions at a gross disadvantage in communicating with voters.
In contrast to Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Lechmere opinion does cite authority and provide reasoning in support of its rule. At issue was the validity of the Board's standard requiring employers to grant access to union organizers in certain circumstances. 119 Under the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 120 the Board's standard was entitled to broad deference unless the Court could find contrary "clear meaning" in the statute. 121 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas found that "clear meaning" in section 7 of the Act, which guarantees the right of selforganization only to "employees."
122 He pointed to the "critical distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom section 7 guarantees the right of self-organization) and nonemployees (to whom section 7 applies only derivatively)."
123 By itself, this left open the question why union organizers, who are "employees" of the union and who are aligned with other employees in collective bargaining, are not "employees" under section 7. The obvious place to look for an answer to this question would be the statutory definition of the term "employee," which is contained in section 2(3) of the Act.
But Justice Thomas chose to conduct his search for the statute's "clear meaning" without so much as a glance at the relevant portion of the statute itself. Why this omission? Section 2(3) states that "[t]he term 'employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed . . . by any . . . person who is not an employer as herein defined."
124 Justice Thomas could have argued that full-time union organizers are excluded from this definition because they are employed by labor organizations, which are not statutory employers except when they are "acting as" employers. 125 In the union-organizing setting, the union is 122. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000); Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537 ("By reversing the Board's interpretation of the statute for failing to distinguish between the organizing activities of employees and nonemployees, we were saying, in Chevron terms, that § 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer's property."). certainly not acting as an employer. However, there is legislative history that weakens this argument. Philip Levy, one of the statute's drafters, proposed language specifying that union organizers are statutory "employees," but it was not included "apparently because it was thought not to be necessary."
126 Why would Levy's language be unnecessary? Perhaps because it was clear to all concerned that the partial exclusion of labor organizations from the definition of "employer" provided no reason at all to hold that union organizerswho are clearly statutory employees in relation to their own employers -should lose that status when performing their function of organizing workers. Labor organizations were partially excluded from the definition of "employer" so that they could not be charged with employer unfair labor practices under then-section 8(3), now section (8)(a)(3). "Otherwise the provisions of the bill which prevent employers from participating in the organizational activities of workers would extend to labor unions as well, and thus would deprive unions of one of their normal functions."
127 In other words, labor organizations were excluded from the definition of "employer" precisely so that they could participate in organizing. In light of this purpose, it would be ironic indeed to seize on the definition of "employer" to prevent union organizers from "participating in the organizational activities of workers."
Whatever the reason, Justice Thomas chose to rely not on the statute, but on the Court's pre-Chevron decision in NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co. 128 In Babcock, the Court had overturned a series of Board orders requiring employers to permit union organizers on their property. The Board had erred, the Court held, by "fail[ing] to make a distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those applicable to nonemployees." 129 Unfortunately for Justice Thomas' rationale, however, the terms "nonemployee" and "employee" as used by the Babcock Court had nothing whatever to do with the statutory term "employees" contained in section 7, and thus could not meet the Chevron requirement of "clear meaning" in the statute. 130 As of 1956, 130. By relying on a pre-Chevron decision, the Lechmere court effectively grandfathered in the Babcock Court's nondeferential approach. Cf. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 55, at 1598-99 (suggesting "a kind of retroactive application of Chevron, through which the Board would be able to revisit old judicial resolutions of textual ambiguities that, in a Chevron world, would have been left to the agency," and pointing out that, "under the proposed approach, Lechmere, in which the Board had sought to revise that resolution, should have come out differently").
when Babcock was decided, the terms "nonemployee" and "employee" had an established usage in cases involving union organizer access to employer property. Courts used the term "nonemployee" in contradistinction not to a statutory "employee" entitled to section 7 rights, but to an employee who was employed by the particular employer and therefore rightfully on the property. 131 Not only was this usage developed without any reference to the statutory term "employee," but it directly conflicted with the statutory definition. "The term 'employee,'" declares the statute, "shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer."
132 But if the statute did not distinguish between employees and nonemployees of a particular employer, the common law of trespass did. As the Board read Babcock, the distinction hinged on the fact "that the nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought to trespass on the employer's property, whereas the employees" did not.
133 Accordingly, the Board held that employers enjoyed the property right under Babcock to exclude even their own off-duty employees -clearly statutory employees entitled to section 7 rights -without pleading any business reason. 134 In short, Babcock's distinction between nonemployees and employees rested not on the statute but on the common law of trespass, raising once again the question of how state common law rights could trump federal statutory rights.
135
Unlike the opinions in Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Babcock opinion addressed this issue directly. "Organization rights are granted to workers, by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights," declared the Court. "Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the 131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1955), gaff's 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (distinguishing "non-employee organizers" from "union organizers who were employees of each company respectively" and contrasting "employee and nonemployee union members").
132. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). This language was inserted precisely to counter the persistent tendency of courts to limit the class of workers entitled to rights. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 62; Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 117, at 329. 2) is clearly disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty employees seeking access to the plant for any purpose and not just to those employees engaging in union activity").
135. Despite Justice Thomas's reference to the term "employees" in section 7, Lechmere, like Babcock & Wilcox before it, has been read not as incorporating the statutory definition of employee, but the common law distinction between trespassers and invitees. See Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 117, at 324-25. Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:518 other." 136 Of course, as any first-year law student can testify, property rights are creatures of state law, not the "National Government." National involvement in property law can, however, be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which prohibit national and state government from depriving a person of property without due process of law or from taking property "without just compensation."
137 This was the approach urged by the company's lawyers, 138 and it is the only apparent explanation of the Babcock Court's reference to the "National Government," which, in turn, is the only rationale for the rule of Lechmere.
Commenting on Babcock, James Atleson remarked that, in light of the opinion's failure to cite the statutory definition of "employee," the Supreme Court evidently "feels free to apply common-law property notions without any felt need to respond to either the language of the act or its history."
139 That the Lechmere Court subsequently managed to find "clear meaning" in the statute sufficient to evade Chevronstill without once citing the governing statutory definition -attests to the arrogance of this judicial liberty. Aside from the reference to the national government in Babcock, and an occasional explicit invocation of the Constitution by dissenting Justices or lower courts, 140 judges have left the trumping power of property rights unexplained and unexamined.
V. HOW EMPLOYERS WON THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO CLASS SOLIDARITY
Class solidarity has not fared well in American courts. Under the common law, judges held that strikes were lawful only if the strikers were motivated by the prospect of immediate economic gain for themselves; broader or more attenuated motives were condemned as "malicious. mutual aid or protection.
142 Moreover, the Supreme Court has construed the Act's secondary boycott ban broadly to include political boycotts on the ground that it is "more rather than less objectionable" for a union to pursue non-traditional objectives instead of higher wages and better working conditions for its own members.
143
But in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., the Court carved out a limited but increasingly important exception for employer class solidarity. 144 Reversing its usual preference for narrowly self-interested activity, the Court ruled that an employer may close a facility to punish its employees for choosing union representation provided that the employer is not motivated by economic self-interest. 145 Management had threatened to close a textile mill that was the economic mainstay of a small southern town if the workers voted to be represented by the Textile Workers Union. 146 Nevertheless, the union won the election by a small margin. Six days later, the company's board of directors voted to close the plant and terminate all 500 employees.
147 Supervisors forthrightly told the workers that the shutdown was because of the union vote, and that the workers would be blacklisted in their search for jobs.
148 Eighty-three percent of the workers then signed a petition renouncing the union, but the top management official declared that "[a]s long as there are seventeen percent of the hard core crowd here, I refuse to run the mill." 149 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." It is difficult to imagine a more dramatic and effective means of coercing employees than to punish them by closing their workplace altogether. The facts of Darlington provide a graphic illustration. Within weeks of the closing, a majority of the union voters had renounced their support for the union in a desperate attempt to recover their jobs. 150 The Board found unfair labor practices and ordered that the employees be made whole for wages lost from the time of the closing until they found substantially equivalent employment.
151
But the Supreme Court announced a new rule that "some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative" they cannot violate section 8(a)(1) no matter how great their impact on section 7 rights, unless they also violate section 8(a)(3), which requires a showing of anti-union discrimination. 152 Furthermore, the Court continued, proof of management's anti-union hostility -of which there was plenty in Darlington -is not enough to establish discrimination. The employer may intentionally destroy the union and punish the workers for exercising their statutory rights unless the Board can prove that these actions were undertaken for the specific purpose of obtaining future economic benefits from the employer's remaining employees.
153 Applying these principles, the Court held that a corporation has an "absolute right" to terminate its employees and go out of business altogether regardless of the impact on section 7 rights -there being no remaining employees from whom to obtain future benefits. 154 Further, a corporation may close a part of its business in retaliation for the exercise of section 7 rights unless the NLRB can prove that the closing had the purpose of chilling unionism among the corporation's remaining employees.
155
Darlington has exerted an increasingly devastating impact on unions as technological advances have smoothed the way for corporations to move their operations. 156 As we have seen, companies are permitted to shut down facilities for retaliatory purposes without any regard for the rights of employees at the closed facilities; the only employees who count are those at the company's other, still-operating facilities. But if those operating facilities are not in the United States, then their employees are not covered by the Act, and the shutdown could not have been for the purpose of chilling their non-existent section 7 rights. "By focusing on the chilling effect on any remaining domestic employees, instead of on the discrimination practiced against those who lost their jobs," Court . . . has immunized multinational runaways." 157 The Darlington Court's failure to consider the coercive impact of the closing on the terminated workers and their town has sparked vigorous criticism over the years. Clyde Summers set the tone early on:
The essence of the Court's logic is that discharge for supporting the union is not itself an unfair labor practice, that it is no wrong as to the ones discharged, and that the law is not concerned with their injury. Discrimination against them is an evil only when it intimidates others; any remedy given them is only to make others feel secure. This is to see in the execution of hostages nothing more than an intimidation of the living; it is to make murder a crime only when the killer's purpose is to instill fear. 158 Why did the Court turn a blind eye to the terminated workers? As to Darlington, the Court asserted that "so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases." 159 To explain this assertion, the Court contrasted the retaliatory plant closing with the (concededly illegal) retaliatory lockout. An employer might use a lockout to win economic concessions from workers, but:
[A] complete liquidation of a business yields no such future benefit for the employer, if the termination is bona fide. It may be motivated more by spite against the union than by business reasons, but it is not the type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act. The personal satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his beliefs and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his example are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the labor statutes were aimed. Although employees may be prohibited from engaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one would consider it a violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employment en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer. The very permanence of such action would negate any future economic benefit to the employees. The employer's right to go out of business is no different.
160
The Court's attempted analogy between permanent plant closings and employees quitting is simply nonsensical. The reason why no one Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:518 would consider it a violation of the Act for employees to quit for the purpose of ruining an employer is that the Act does not even purport to prohibit employees from doing anything; it prohibits labor organizations or their agents from restraining or coercing employers in the selection of their representatives for purposes of collective bargaining. 161 If a union ordered workers to quit permanently in order to punish an employer for exercising its freedom to select representatives (the appropriate analogy), there is little doubt that the Board and the courts would find an unfair labor practice.
On further examination, the statement only becomes more mysterious. As we have seen, courts have long held that strikes become more -not less -vulnerable to legal suppression when they are motivated by considerations other than economic gain. This principle is grounded on the idea that because a strike involves the deliberate infliction of economic damage, it is justifiable only if the strikers themselves have an observable interest at stake. 162 Yet, under Darlington, employers enjoy the privilege of dealing catastrophic economic damage to entire working class communities not only despite their lack of any observable economic interest, but because they have no such interest and may -in fact -be "motivated . . . by spite against the union." Thus, Darlington stands the old common-law malice test exactly on its head: for employers, malicious motivation can be a ticket to legal immunity.
But in fact, of course, there is much more to retaliatory shutdowns than mere spite or malice. Like sympathy strikes and secondary strikes, they produce valuable benefits -benefits that are reaped not directly by the perpetrator, but by fellow members of the perpetrator's class. The shutdown operates like a public flogging, intimidating not only the victims themselves, but also every worker who hears of their plight. Darlington excludes this effect from consideration unless the employer stands to gain individually from the intimidation of its own remaining employees. Employers that act out of class solidarity, helping to produce a cowed and compliant workforce for their fellow employers, are privileged to commit what would otherwise be statutory violations.
How, then, can Darlington be explained? Without specifically mentioning the Constitution, the Court applied the clear statement rule: "A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act." 163 At the equivalent juncture in the opinion below, the Court of Appeals made the constitutional connection explicit. "A statute authorizing an order forcing the continued pursuit of operations in these circumstances," opined the court, "would be of doubtful validity." 164 The Supreme Court's reference to "a single businessman" choosing to go out of business invokes the rights both of property and contract. This problem was mentioned on the floor of Congress, where proponents of the NLRA assured opponents that the bill would not prevent an operator from closing "his" plant. 165 Like our other four "of course" statements, then, Darlington can be explained as a belated echo of Lochner-era economic due process.
But if the Court was Lochnerizing, it was doing an awfully poor job of it. After all, Darlington and Deering-Milliken were both corporations -not "single" businessmen. Moreover, the Board did not order anyone to remain in business; it required only that the corporations compensate employees who were terminated for retaliatory reasons. The Supreme Court did not comment on this point; it simply assumed that the Board's ruling was equivalent to the "proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to." But obviously the government can impose some burdens on going out of business, for example taxes on the sale of assets. It is not at all clear why the employer's liberty interest requires not only that it should be allowed to go out of business for retaliatory reasons, but also that it be freed from any obligation to factor in the cost of compensating terminated employees for the loss of their statutory right to organize. (statement of Rep. Griswold) ("There is nothing in the bill to keep an operator from closing his plant. There is nothing in the bill that says you shall reach an agreement -nothing of that sort.").
166. See Getman, Section 8(a)(3), supra note 158, at 754 (observing that "the conclusion that an employer should not be forced to stay in business against his will does not require the further conclusion that his conduct in closing down is outside the scope of the Act").
167. Summers, supra note 158, at 67. Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:518 constitutional decision. In the constitutional law of the post-New Deal era, as in Darlington, non-economic motivation weighs in favor of legal protection. For example, political speech occupies a higher position on the "hierarchy of first amendment values" than commercial speech, 168 and politically-motivated boycotts higher than economically-motivated boycotts. 169 Put this together with the established -albeit bitterly criticized -principle that corporations are entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as natural persons, and we have a constitutional explanation for Darlington's right of corporations to stand on their beliefs and punish workers for unionizing. On this view, the anomaly in the law lies not in Darlington itself, but in the Court's failure to apply the same rule to unions that refuse to handle goods for solidaristic or political reasons. If noneconomic motivation weighs against the suppression of employer conduct, then why should the same motivation make union conduct "more rather than less objectionable" and thus subject to greater restriction? 170 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PERFECT CRIME
This Essay has examined five important labor law doctrines that were originally announced as "of course" propositions. In each case, the proposition in question deployed an employer right grounded in state common law as a trump over a labor right grounded in federal statutory law -thus reversing the normal hierarchy of laws. And in each case, it turned out that what the Supreme Court treated as a matter "of course," had been justified by lawyers and lower court judges in constitutional terms. State common law rights of property and contract were elevated above federal statutory rights of selforganization and collective action through Lochner-era notions of economic due process and interstate commerce.
This summary leaves us with some important questions. First, if these decisions are best explained in terms of constitutional law, then why didn't the Supreme Court just come out and say so? The answer may be found in the Court's experience with its Fansteel opinion, the only one of the five to mention the Constitution directly. Although the opinion as a whole drew mixed reactions, the constitutional language in particular drew harsh criticism. Professor J. Denson Smith charged that Fansteel had revived the discredited economic due process decisions of Coppage v. Kansas and Adair v. United States. 171 Once again, he explained, the due process clause had been applied to the employer-employee relationship so as "to protect the general control of the former over the latter," and this time "even during a period of industrial strife, and notwithstanding that the employer had been guilty of unfair labor practices under the Act." 172 Others agreed. 173 On the assumption that Fansteel partook of the pre-New Deal mentality, New York Times columnist Arthur Krock predicted that the dissenters' position -which was "eloquent of New Deal reasoning" in emphasizing the Board's statutory power to remedy unfair labor practices -would eventually prevail. 174 The reaction to Fansteel's constitutional language signaled that if the Court were to persist in openly resurrecting economic due process in labor law, it would do so at a heavy cost in legitimacy.
So the Justices hid the economic due process in "of course" statements. And, just as importantly, they pushed it away from what were then the central issues and to the margins -out of the political and professional spotlights. 175 Many of the "of course" statements Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:518 were barely noticed at the time. It is only over the past several decades, as their impact has been magnified by social and economic change, that they have emerged as central issues. Taken together, they may account for a substantial proportion of the decline in the American labor movement. The permanent replacement rule of Mackay, ignored at the time and rarely utilized until the 1980s, now operates to prevent workers from exercising their right to strike for better conditions. 176 The no-deterrence rule of Consolidated Edison, also little noted at the time, now ensures that even when employers are caught red-handed, they stand to gain financially from violating workers' rights. 177 The employer's right to exclude union organizers under Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere poses an increasingly formidable barrier to union-worker communication as more and more jobs are located in self-contained facilities like malls, shopping centers, industrial parks and office parks. 178 Finally, the employer's rightannounced in Darlington -to punish workers for unionizing by closing their place of employment out of "spite," which was considered at the time unlikely to be exercised very often, now causes serious problems due to the increasingly global scope of economic activity. 179 This brings us to the question of legitimacy. Had the Court openly grounded these rulings in the Constitution, it is highly unlikely that they would remain good law today. For half a century, the Court has disavowed economic due process. Despite academic efforts to revive Lochner, the decision continues to operate as a negative precedent, and the charge of Lochnerizing rarely fails to elicit strong denials. 180 But by couching its rulings as matters of statutory construction, the Court has entrenched them against change. As Cynthia Estlund recently observed, labor law has ossified. No matter how devoid of statutory reasoning or how destructive of the statute's purposes in light of changed conditions, old Supreme Court constructions of the statute are accorded a kind of super-stare decisis. 181 Not only are the corpses in labor law buried in "of course" statements, then, but they are buried deeply, beyond the reach of judicial or administrative change. Through misdirection, the Court has pulled off the perfect crime.
